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 Whereas Wittgenstein composed fantasy dialogues via self­-analysis, Lacan decomposed dialogic phantasies in the “analytic situation, [wherein reside] two subjects, each of whom is provided with two objects, [namely,] the ego and the other.” But do they add up? Who/what/where is the other subject’s Other subject? In practice, how does the analyst, confronted with the analysand, distinguish “between [1] the Other to whom his speech should be addressed, and [2] the second other who is the one he sees before him, about whom and by means of whom the first speaks to him”? To show why the psyche ‘snaps shut’ in the fig.71 Helix (over), we ‘pry it open’ in the fig.70 Square (above). To account for the symbolic order whereby (1) universals of language determine (3) particulars in speech, “the Cartesian subject is presupposed by the unconscious” and conversely, “The Other is the dimension required by the fact that speech affirms itself as truth. The unconscious is, between [subject and Other], their cut in action.” Lacan roots the dis/conjunctions of this cut in the “vel of alienation”—an (am)bivalent logical XOR/NOR operator fashioned on Freud’s Ichspaltung.

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 While initially “Freud ground it in a splitting, not of the subject, but of the object”, in Lacan, the (imaginary) dyad is determined by force of (1) the signifier: “the ego masks its duplicity [in an] image that becomes fixed—this is [4] the ideal ego—from the point at which [3] the subject fixates as [2] ego­-ideal.” In phantasmic terms, you can only ‘picture yourself’ as a viewed (ideal) ego from an (ego) ideal viewpoint. By re­-winding Lacan’s Schema L vectors(above), we see how “it is through the pathway of a specific gap in his imaginary relationship with his semblable that he has been able to enter into this [symbolic] order as a subject.” Thus, where I speak not of me, myself, but of “the I”, it speaks of itself as that subject in self­-regard to which Descartes redacted “I think therefore I am” to “I think. I exist.” Amid this phrase pair, to paraphrase Lacan, the silent wake of “therefore” is filled only by “I speak”—by which, in want of warrant, “I liethe impropriety of which, so to speak, goes without saying. Conversely, “consciousness, in which the ego assures itself an indisputable existence [presupposes] the ego­-ideal as unary trait ([as in] the Cartesian cogito).” Ergo, in sum, I think I am.

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