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 Among Wittgenstein’s more striking continuities lies his fidelity to premodern metaphysics—or, put the other way, his refusal to grant assent to contemporaneous claims (e.g. of Carnap or Popper) to have ‘escaped’ their strictures. His (posthumously published) Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology are shot through with conflicts we shan’t attempt to reconcile, for therein he strives not to eliminate either side of the onto­-epistemic divide, but rather complicates both even further: “The Inner is tied up with the Outer logically, and not just empirically [erfahrungsmäßig]. In investigating the laws of evidence for the mental, I am investigating the essence of the mental. Is that true? Yes. The essence [Wesen] is not something that can be shown; only its features [Zügen] can be described. But doesn’t a prejudice argue against this?” Argue against what? In what way? By composing two Squares on the basis of figs.24­-27 (Hume, Kant, et al.), we can explicate L.W.’s oppositions on their respective conceptual planes: in fig.68 we reintegrate his Noms (de plume) in interpersonal terms of psychology; in fig.69 we ad/verb/ially dis­-integrate him in impersonal terms of philosophy. 

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 The nouns account straightforwardly for intersubjective traversals: my essence or being (Wesen), is demonstrated to you in my characteristics or features (Zügen), and by my explicit expressions (Äußerungen). Conversely, if you have ‘made an impression’ on me, your behavior provided sufficient external evidence for my experience to register an informed internal picture. Despite that Wittgenstein is widely presumed to have evacuated the mentalistic Inner in favor of a behavioristic Outer, we shall once again follow him across the psychical divide, from inside­-outward (centrifugal) contemplation to outside­-inward (centripetal) reckoning. From fig.68 to fig.69 it takes mere lexical interchanges to radically redraw the central and circumferential limits of our knowledge. The adjectives thus provide a rather more complex account of asubjective transpositions: where the empiricist imperative drives outward towards physical explanation of mental phenomena, the rationalist directive draws inward to mathematical description of metaphysical ‘truths’ as if a priori formulae (e.g. “2+2=4”). Again, the difference hinges on how far in or out we pull or push our conceptual boundaries.

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