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 Poulet’s two­-step is doubly problematic. “For in order to be able to set a limit to thought,” warns Wittgenstein, “we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought).” While this paradox of impredicative (not to say ‘unspeakable’) self­-illimitability bookends the Tractatus, we may find earlier variations more illustrative. As Ernst Cassirer notes, “to speak with Hegel, whose basic thought Cusanus anticipates with clarity—knowledge could not set up the limit if it had not already transgressed it in some sense.” (1927) Here we shall compare two such transgressions, in which Cusanus applies mechanics (of time, space, motion, cause)  to metaphysics (of cosmology, ontology, theology) by way of epistemology (of knowledge). In his de Possest (literally, ‘the Potentiactual’) of 1460, he extrapolates the coincidentia­ oppositorum in three moves. First, a concrete demonstration: “As a boy pitches out a top, he pulls it back with its string ... until it seems (while moving at its faster speed) to be motionless and at rest.” This sets up a parallax (a perspective shift) in working memory that moves (the top) into immobility

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 Second, a geometric schema: “So let us describe [one] circle, which is being rotated about a point as would the upper circle of a top; and [another] which is fixed. Is it not true that the faster the movable circle is rotated, the less it seems to be moved?” True—but this still binds us to concrete phenomena. Third, a convergent progression: “Now suppose that movable­-potential is in it actually; i.e., suppose that it is actually being moved as fast as is possible. In that case, would it not be completely immobile?” Would it, or are we not primed for the conceptual leap into infinitesimal calculus? And who’s moving what exactly? To model the problem in the fig.56 Columns (above), each pair­-of-pairs has a formal contradiction meet a conventional contrary that in turn negates its own contradiction. As such, any of the +A terms would suffice to convoke a strict Semiotic Square, wherein four terms share six pairwise relations. However, as a group of three fourfolds, we see how repeat cycles of pairwise substitution and negation can bring a denotative concept (‘caused motion’) into connotative self­-opposition: in six moves, impassive is brought to oppose its own synonym, unmoved

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