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 As a marketer, you must in­-scribe, im­-plicate, and im­-press your brand into the imagination of your target and onto the sublime stage of phantasy across which each brand encounter convokes a cascade of phantasms—cross­-modal memory images (of sights, sounds, smells, etc.), with all associated affects. Your brand message consists in the sum their phantasmatic effects. As an analyst, you must disentangle these same matrices (from the full phantasmagoria) if you wish to ex­-press, ex­-plicate, and de­-scribe the overt and covert messaging triggered thereby. Of course, these praxes are radically asymmetrical: the former deploys capital via images that stimulate the full range of simultaneous perceptions; the latter deploys words in sequential propositions to stimulate—what, more critique? Both pursuits must navigate imagery along ambiguous lines first drawn by Aristotle: “To the thinking soul phantasms serve as if they were contents of perception (as when it asserts or denies them to be good or bad it avoids or pursues them). This is why the soul never thinks without phantasy.” As we deploy the lexical survey of fig.30 (above), we put these ambiguities into play:

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 First, to dig out of the semantic drift from Greek to English:  if ‘imaginary fantasy’ connotes frivolous flights, ‘phantasmic imagination’ denotes the very ground of cognition on which imagistic phantasms configure our preconceptual interactions. Imagination differs from assertion and denial;” as Aristotle puts it, “for what is true or false involves a synthesis of concepts.” but “In what will the primary concepts differ from phantasms?” The crucial ambivalence—all the way up to Kant’s Einbildungskraft—asks: what causes our imagery, or, what part do we play in the constitution of our own thoughts? For this, we look to the verbs: you might, e.g., sit on a park bench and passively perceive dogs fetching sticks while you actively ask yourself “where do I imagine myself in five years?” So some images are active, some passive? But then you might say “I often fantasize about past and future adventures”—yet when you encounter (hypersexualized) imagery, you are implicated to its scenario whether you like (or know) it or not. Would you then say “I am fantasized by” the image, and its denizens? No; you might say “I am fascinated by” her/him/it—but does that answer our question?

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