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fig.24—the infernal u­-turn of the selfsame (or, insert pun here)

 To get a better sense of how the ‘cept’ and ‘ject’ terms interact dynamically, we twist the fig.22 grid into the fig.24 chiasmus. While we preserve the grid’s primordial in/out X­-axis, our new Y-axis draws the discretely paired motions into an oscillating fourfold cycle. By applying Lull’s method of combinatorial permutation, we can provoke a series of questions from each phase—for example, scaling each side of the in/out divide: does our ‘modern’ (yet stubbornly Cartesian) conception of subjectivity not preclude the objectivity of perception? Or again, vice­-versa: how does our perception of objects color the (self­-)conceptualization of subjects? That is, does seeing objects as ‘things’ make us, as subjects, ‘non­-things’? Now across the divide: can the objectivization of concepts account for the subjectivization of percepts? More particularly, which concepts can we qualify as ‘objective’ in light of our ‘subjective’ perception? By conforming the X and Y­-axis metaterms, we can further interrogate the phases of our dynamical cycle.

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 fig.25—cognitivist phenomenology in pursuit of own tail

 We can now apply the model to retrace such problems as the embodiment of causal attribution vis­-à-vis self-directed actions: Merleau­-Ponty’s ‘outside-inward’ experience pulls affection (from ­-A to +B) in a “sensation [that] concerns not my own being, the one for which I am responsible, and for which I make decisions”—that in turn push ‘inside­-outward’ (+A to -B) in the causation of Patricia­ Churchland’s “efference copy of a command to make a movement”. Now, going full­-circle (full square?): Churchland’s double sensation of non­-self­-tickling is at once anticipated in the movement of her hand towards its intended object and retroactively attributed by subjectivization of that object—viz., her own body. In short, her feignedobjective’—to tickle herself—is canceled in advance by her own subjectivity. Yet within her hypothetical self­-tickler, asynchrony between executive command and attributive decision manifests in partial self­-objectification (of a fragmented self­-model) such that ‘one and the same’ event remains partitioned as two.

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