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fig.22—conceptual grasp versus thrown projection


 We can sort out our phenomenological preliminaries on the Semiotic Square: as with our sex/gender terms, we can correlate two term pairs by multiple reconfiguration. As we corner the nominal entities on the fig.22 grid, we see how (A) the differentiation of objects as ‘thrown’ by subjects is reflected in (B) the conformity of percepts as ‘grasped’ by concepts. As we suffix the latter to name capacities (or in Kantian terms, faculties), we note how the generic outside­-inwardness of Hume’s “perception” is doubled in a “conception” (Lat. con­-cipere ‘together­-take’) we are as apt to take as generation (i.e. biological procreation) as generalization (of logical categories). As we suffix the ‘ject’ terms into dispositions (or perspectives), we note how the common use of ‘objectivity’ posits a privileged mode of subjectivity that we might ‘attain’ if only by removing ourselves to a superior vantage point. We can reconsider this conceptual shift via verbal nouns—e.g., for ‘objectiv(iz)ation’ versus ‘objectification’ compare objectivize to objectify.

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fig.23—a Kantian combinatory of “Practical Reason


 Contingent to our metaterm choices, the X and Y axes of fig.23 should comprise a well­-formed Biaxial Plot. Here we briefly scan the epistemic constraints Kant set upon the subject: “Now, since every appearance contains a manifold” he tells us, and “perceptions occur separately and singly, a combination of them [demands in us] an active faculty for the synthesis of this manifold. To this faculty I give the title imagination. Its action, when immediately directed to perceptions, I entitle apprehension.” (1790) For the modern Kantian, however, his (‘Idealist’) subjectivation of phenomena (‘always­-already’) precludes his (‘Realist’) objectivation of noumena (‘in­-themselves’)—and as such, preempts our efforts to account for the reality of material objects. That is, by undermining the externality of percepts, idealist phenomenology can only account for the internality of concepts—an account by which our faculties of conception as subjects are strictly limited by (or to) our perception of objects. But is this account necessarily incomplete?

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