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 With an ear to etymology (if not philology), the history of Western thought reads as a series of unsuccessful attempts to turn verbs into nouns by way of adverbials. This is perhaps most evident in the battery of terms affixed to the two lexica ‘ject’ (from Lat. jacere ‘to throw’, from  PIE *ye­- ‘to do’) and ‘cept’ (from Lat. capere ‘to take’, from PIE *kap­- ‘to grasp’)—for not only do we find (onto­-episto-psycho-logico-semio-lingo) discourses dedicated to these lexemes, we find that discourse in general is governed by them. By analyzing denotation among parts of speech, we can judge the extent of this governance. For example, our ‘ject’ pairs reciprocate inward and outward, both abstractly (subjective/objective) and concretely (inject/eject), yet just as Deleuze stressed, Kant internalizes the subject/object relation to a double­-bind. When we consider how we are inwardly subject to ‘external laws’ we seem passive, or heteronomous (other­-determined); but when we consider how we are wont to subject others outwardly by externalizing our ‘internal will’ we seem active, or autonomous (self­-determined). 

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 By cross­-interrogating the two lexemes in figs.20­-21, we can get a better grip on the extension and intension of both. The point here is not to ‘put everything in its proper place’ as in lexicography, but to consider what is revealed by dis­-placements, gaps, asymmetries. For example, as abstract thinking subjects, we must submit continuous percepts to segmentation by discrete concepts in order to apprehend them as particular objects of thought (cf. James, §1.2.7). In concrete terms, we must grasp a thing before we throw it—yet we are as apt to locate such ‘things’ inside ourselves as outside. Hume, for example, finds that within “what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or another, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure.” (1739) By subjectivizing objects, does Hume objectify the subject? As our ‘cept’ pairs pull inward, they relocate thought’s outer limit: We speak of how we conceptualize objects, but not of how we ‘perceptualize’ subjects—though we might say Hume did exactly that, thereby setting the stage for Kant’s ‘Copernican’ turn.

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