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fig.13—not unlike trying to translate Vorstellungsrepräsentanz

 Our inquiry to which “kind[s] of dualism” we keep “falling into” will depend not only upon our criteria, but who we ask, and to which criteria they submit the terms that inform their answer. In this case, philosophical neurobiologist Patricia­ Churchland (2008) assures Blackmore that “There is a real dualism here, but not one involving spooky stuff. One of the things the brain does is build a model, and within that model it marks the difference between what’s inner and what’s outer.” Thus, she reduces three distinctions to one description the better to serve her explanation. This scientistic framing grants her remarks the propositional veneer of an ‘objective’ truth­-value. But to internalize the psychological problem (of seeming), she must externalize the ontological problem (of being)—a move that would undermine our would­-be epistemological bridge (to knowing). Put simply, if “what’s outer” is marked “within” a subjective inner model, the objectiveworld out there” (of other bodies, up to and including my own,) remains per se unknown to “me in here.”

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 This specific onto­-epistemic maneuver originates “In Kant,” as Deleuze (1962) tells us, where “the problem of the relation of subject and object tends to be internalized; it becomes the problem of a relation between subjective faculties which differ in nature”—the very problem of neo­-Kantian metaphysics that underwrites cognitive science. As Eric Kandel  (2006) reiterates, “the brain must combine inputs from several different sensory modalities and then generate a complete internal representation that does not depend exclusively on any one input.” As such, if I take my brain to actually internalize what is externally presented (to whom?), it must virtually externalize (to where?) what is internally re­-presented. Firstly (to whom?), the Kantian subject is constituted in each transcendental gap—between each phenomenon (the thing or event as it appears ‘for us’) and its corresponding noumenon (the ‘thing­-in­-itself’ [Ding­-an-Sich] as it... dis­-appears?). Secondly (to where?), insofar as Kant’s noumenal unknowables have been exiled as vestiges of an objectivized world, we are each marooned on subjectivized islands (as Thomas Metzinger puts it, as/in/on our “phenomenal self­-model”). 

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