previous | | 2.2.2 (107) | contents

 


 “I often feel that I’m falling again and again into some kind of dualism” notes (ex­-(para-))psychologist Susan Blackmore, “between inner and outer, or subjective and objective, or me in here and the world out there.” But how many “kind[s] of dualism” is she “falling again and again into”? one? three? innumerable? By variations upon conditional differences, she traces out a semantic field that no single pairwise term­-set could corral. While her contraries are clearly paired as in fig.12 (over), we can apprehend them only by considering each under a variety of metaterm criteria. We might collect each pair into a category—e.g., we already framed them in visuospatial terms, yet Wittgenstein cautions that “The concept of the ‘inner picture’ is misleading, since this concept uses the theouter picture for a model.” Then again, in topological terms, “inner and outer” provides the minimal specification for any closed surface, from a box to a basketball. Were we to apply the metaterms to mediation instead of classification, we would stretch ourselves across the liminal surface—the boundary or borderline that separates inner from outer. But how is the choice of criteria from which we draw one judgment likely to reveal itself in following judgments?

Genders222nb.jpg

index | 2.2.3 (108) | | next

Genders223.jpg


fig.12—wherein “some kind of dualism” unfolds into several


 For example: within the visuospatial modality, “subjective and objective” recede to two perspectival viewpoints—or rather, one actual point­-of-view and one virtual field­-of-view—or, a field there viewed from a point here—for from where and upon what could we enjoy an ‘objective viewpoint’? In epistemological terms, i.e., in terms of knowing, the intersubjective modality of evidence­-based consensus is the middle-ground on which such folk-notional figures as ‘subjective opinion’ and ‘objective fact’ compete for conceptual hegemony. Yet in topographical terms, mediation of this kind works to securely place “me in here” only insofar as it displaces “the world out there.” In short, Blackmore gives voice to the strictly folk­-psychological necessity of folk­-metaphysics—more particularly, of ontological naïve realism—that ‘things are as they seem to me’ and that ‘I am who I seem to be.’ As her correlations build upon several everyday presuppositions about the seeming of being, we must examine each if we wish to make sense of any.

© 2008-2012 Ian C Thorne. all rights reserved. about credits privacy contact share