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If you do know that here is one hand, we’ll grant you all the rest.

                               —Ludwig Wittgenstein, c.1951

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2.2  Now you see it, now you don’t.

 The umbrella term ‘phenomenology’ spans the study of how we perceive and bring meaning to events, objects, even ourselves; as such, it has long invited philosophers and scientists of every stripe to practice under its theoretic shelter. But when we frame phenomena (Gk. phainomenon ‘that which appears to view’ from phainein ‘to show’) in terms of ‘subjective’ events, we retroject a bridge to the more problematical ‘objective’ events we thereby presume to have produced them. If we nonetheless contract the scope of ‘phenomena’ to the sub­-personal experiences of a solitary person in an actual physical space, we can address them in asubjective terms, e.g., of neurobiology or gestalt psychology; if we extend it to include the supra­-personal interaction of multiple subjects immersed in a virtual sociocultural space, we must address them in intersubjective terms, e.g., of linguistics, semiotics, or metapsychology. While this expanse of dualisms may present a formidable ground, in this section we simply inquire of a few notable figures.

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