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fig.73—Lull, Bruno; Eno, Wildgen; Eco, Rossi.

 Of Eco’s “some” we note Descartes 1637 (Sum before Cogito) makes a crucial (if misguided) distinction: “I noticed that the syllogisms of logic and [most] of its teachings are of less use for learning than for explaining to others what one already knows, or even, as in the art of Lull, for speaking without judgment about that of which one is ignorant.” While this rings hollow as a link in a catena, it projects an arc from Leibniz to Carnap (if not Kant to Quine): Insofar as formal method renders a logic without judgment, it proves coterminous to a metaphysics of that of which one is ignorant—of things as they exist outside our minds, i.e., ontology. While Newton’s Laws split clean of his theosophy, Leibniz’s Law is backed by his (Cartesian) Principle and his (Brunian) Monadology. A ‘double­-bind’—or a triple? While Eco takes two viewpoints, Paolo Rossi notes Lull’s “distinction between the three natural powers of the soul—capacitas, memoria, and discretio—each of which [corresponds to an] ‘artificial power’ which can be acquired by means of the art.”

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fig.74—retorting mnemotechné of men­-that-think-like-machines

—and despite multiplicity, “Lull does not apply the rules of the art to the specific field of memory, but places the entire structure of the Lullian combinatoria at the service of artificial memory. Eco poses “treat[ments]” and Rossi recounts “powers”; as both sets are mediated by “the art | ificial memory” we reconcile differentia (Lull’s, Bruno’s, theirs, ours) in fig.74. If we now treat ‘memory’ as a competence (faculty, talent) and ‘mnemonics’ as its performance (praxis, discipline), the historical accidents of semantic drift cover over the hysterical substance of pragmatic dogma. Semantic or social, our networks (lattices) of memorial loci (nodes) are bound by vectors (edges); what do these vincula intertwine? The cause of an effect? the object of a subject? a line of sight, or a ray of light? metaphor or metonym? as or as if...? To follow, e.g., Zizek’s rationale (§1.5), you do not need recourse to the logistics of Hegel and Kant—but you must ‘hold in mind’ such topological forms as Aristotle’s LSO and Lacan’s Schema L by way of a topographical heuristic.

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